Conflict between the debt holders and shareholders

Conflict between the debt holders and shareholders Myers and Majluf (1984) in their pioneering work on pecking-order theory show that if the investors are not well informed about the information which the insiders have, the equity of that firm may be severely mispriced. In their paper they also show that if any firm wants to fund its new project by new equity then the equity can be so undervalued that the new investors will be better off by getting more value than the projects NPV. So the organization will go for such a source which is not underpriced by the market like internal funds or riskless debt. So, in case of information asymmetry companies should follow an order of financing. Myers (1984) refers to this order as the pecking order. As per the pecking order the firm first goes for internal funds and then for low risk debt and finally equity. As we have three major capital structure theories in the literature, it becomes an interesting task to test which theory characterises the behaviour of Indian firms in their determining th e capital structure during the bullish phase of capital market. There are many empirical studies [Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984), Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Wald (1999) and Booth et al. (2001)] which have been done to test the applicability of the above mentioned capital structure theories in the developed and developing countries. Market Timing Theory Market timing, a comparatively old initiative (see Myers, 1984), is having a new surge of fame in the academic literature. In study by Graham and Harvey (2001), managers carry on to offer support for the plan. Consistent with the behavior of market timing, firms inclined to issue equity subsequent a stock price run-up. Furthermore, researches that analyze long-run stock profits following business financing events find proof reliable with market timing. Lucas and McDonald (1990) investigate a dynamic adverse selection model that mix essentials of the pecking order with the market timing theory, which can give details of pre-issue run-ups but not post issue Under performance. Baker and Wurgler (2002) said that capital structure is best perceived as the cumulative effect of precedent attempts to time the market. The basic suggestion is that managers look at existing circumstances in both debt market and equity markets. If they found a need of financing, they use whichever market present ly looks more favorable. If neither market looks positive, they may go for defer issuances. On the other hand, if present conditions look strangely favorable, funds possibly will be raised still if the firm has no need for any funds at this time. While this idea seems reasonable, it has not anything to say about most of the factors conventionally considered in studies of corporate financing. However, it does propose that stock returns and debt market circumstances will play an significant role in capital structure decisions. LITERATURE REVIEW The first paper on capital structure was written by Miller and Modigliani in 1958, Showing that subject to some restrictive situation, the impact of leveraging on the worth of firm is immaterial; the conceptually provided that the worth of firm is not dependent upon the capital structure decision given that certain conditions are met. Because of the unrealistic assumptions in MM irrelevance theory, research on capital structure gave birth to other theories. According to the traditional (or static) trade-of theory (TOT), firms select optimal capital structure by comparing the tax benefits of the debt, the costs of bankruptcy and the costs of agency of debt and equity, that is to say the corrective role of debt and the fact that debt effects from informational cost than outside equity. (Modigliani and Miller, 1963; Stiglitz, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977; Titman, 1984.) The Trade Off theory says that a firms adjustment toward an optimal leverage is influenced by three factors namely taxes, xosts of financial distress and agency costs. Baxter (1967) argued that the extensive use of debt increases the chances of bankruptcy because of which creditors demand extra risk premium. He said that firms should not use debt beyond the point where the cost of debt becomes larger than the tax advantage. In the so-called Pecking Order Theory (POT) (Donaldson, 1961; Myers and Majluf, 1984; Myers, 1984), because of asymmetries of information between insiders and outsiders, the company will prefer to be financed first by internal resources, then by debt and finally by stockholders equity. The debt ratio depends then on the degree of information asymmetry, on the capacity of self-financing and on the various constraints which the company meets in the access to the various sources of financing. So, in the pecking order world, observed leverage reflects the past profitability and investment opportunities of the companies. The dynamic trade-off theory (DTOT) tries a compromise between TOT and POT (Fischer et al., 1989; Leland, 1994, 1998[1]). Although, due to information asymmetries, market imperfections and transaction costs, many companies allow their leverage ratios to drift away from their targets for a time, when the distance becomes large enough managers take steps to move their companies back toward the targets. While the POT explains short-run deviation from the target, the traditional TOT holds in the long run. Following this approach, leverage must converge toward a target leverage ratio. That would no be the case following POT because managers make no effort to turn around changes in leverage. Two additional theories also reject the idea of timely meeting toward a target leverage ratio. According to the theories of market timing and inertia, the capital structure is the result at a given time of an historical process. Supporters of the market timing approach (Jalilvand and Harris, 1984; Korajczyk et al., 1991; Lucas and McDonald, 1990; Jung et al., 1996; Loughran et al., 1994; Baker and Wurgler, 2002) argue that companies will sell overpriced equity shares. Companys share prices will fluctuate around their factual value, and managers inclined to issue shares when the market-to-book ratio is high. A small debt ratio must thus follow a long period of high market-to-book ratio. According to the managerial inertia approach (Welch, 2004) companies do not adjust their debt ratio to the fluctuations of the market value of their equity. High market-to-book ratio must thus be accompanied by small debt. Graham and Harvey (2001) find that chief financial officers in the USA express concern about earnings volatility in capital structure choices. According to Mohammad M. Omran and John Pointon (2009) study, one of our issues of interest is whether debt is negatively associated with earnings volatility, in which case firms react to the risk, and manage it by reducing debt. On the other hand, if debt is found to be positively associated with earnings volatility, then they do not appear to manage the risk. Ayesha Mazhar and Mohamed Nisar (1997) have discussed the determinants of capital structure of Pakistani firms. They selected a sample from Pakistani companies registered on Islamabad Stock Exchange. The sample is divided into two sub-samples of private and government owned companies to make comparison between both sectors. The sample comprised 91 Pakistani companies out of which 80 companies are private and 11 are government owned covering the period of 1999-2006. They have taken debt to equity as a proxy of leverage of a firm, and tangibility of assets, profitability, size, growth, tax provision and return on assets as independent variables. They use correlation to determine the degree of association between different variables. Spearmen correlation is used for all independent variables association with dependent variables. Regression is also used to measure the relationship between dependent and independent variables. Attaullah shah and saifullah khan (2007) they used two variants of penal data i.e. constant coefficient model and fixed effect model to calculate the determinants of capital structure of Karachi Stock Exchange listed non-financial firms from1994 to2002. Pooled regression investigation was applied with the hypothesis that there were no industry or time effects. Though, by means of fixed effect dummy variable regression, the coefficients for a amount of industries were significant displaying there were significant industry effects later we accepted the late model for our investigation. He had measured effect of seven explanatory variables is measured on leverage ratio which is designed by dividing the total debt by total assets. Safdar Ali Butt and ArshadHasan(2009) had explores the association between capital structure and corporate governance of stock exchange listed companies in an equity market. The study considered the period of 2002 to 2005 for which 58 randomly selected non-financial listed companies from Karachi Stock Exchange has been investigated by using multivariate regression line analysis with fixed effect model method. Managerial ownership has negative relationship with debt to equity ratio indicating that concentration of ownership induces the managers to lower the gearing levels. Institutional ownership has positive relationship with capital structure which is consistent with corporate governance philosophy but this relation is statistically insignificant. Traditional determinants of capital structure like size and profitability have significantly effect on corporate financing decisions. Profitability is negatively related with debt to equity ratio and it is consistent with pecking order hyp othesis. Similarly, size has positive relationship which shows that large firms can arrange debt financing due to long term Relationship and better collateral offering. NengjiuJu, Robert Parrino, Allen M. Poteshman, and Michael S. Weisbach Abstract (2005) this paper inspect optimal capital structure choice by means of a dynamic capital structure model that is standardized to reflect genuine firm features. They also examine the relation between firm value and capital structure. They estimate indicate that the impact on firm value of moderate deviations from optimal capital structure is small. This paper suggests that the trade-off model performs reasonably well in predicting capital structures for firms with typical levels of debt. This paper also shows that the major forces affecting a firms financing decisions are corporate taxes and bankruptcy costs. Mohamad H. Mohamad, Professor of Business Administration. School of Management, University Utara Malaysia (Northern University of Malaysia), Sintok, Kedah DarulAman, Malaysia (1995).they examine the determinants of firms capital structure in Malaysia covering the period between 1986 to 1990. There are significant inter-industry differences in capital structure among Malaysian companies. Highly-leveraged firms are more likely to earn higher profits than less-leveraged firms. Similarly the relation between firms profit and equity ratio is also positive and is reflected in terms of the importance of efficient capital markets. Laurence Booth, VaroujAivazian, AsliDemirguc-Kunt, Vojislav Maksimovic(1999) has analyzed capital structure of firms in ten developing countries and provide indication that these choices are affected by the same variables as in advanced countries. But, there are constantly repeated differences across countries, when corporations choose to use of debt financing; they are altering some predictable future cash flows away from equity pretenders in exchange for cash up front. The issues that drive this decision remain mysterious regardless of a vast theoretical literature and years of experimental tests. The quantity of proof is large, and so it is frequently all too relaxed to provide some pragmatic support for nearly any idea. It is satisfactory for a given paper but more challenging for the general expansion of our thoughtful of capital structure choice. As an outcome, in current decades the literature has not had a concrete experimental basis to differentiate the weaknesses and streng ths of the main theories. Numerous theories of capital structure have been proposed which theory shall we take seriously? Of course, opinions differ. Remarkably, nearly all corporate finance textbooks inclined to the trade-off theory in which bankruptcy costs and deadweight taxation are key operators. Myers (1984) projected the pecking order theory in which there is a financing hierarchy of retained earnings, debt, and then equity. In recent times, the idea that firms are engage in market timing has gain popularity. In conclusion, agency theory lurks in the background of a lot theoretical conversation. Agency concerns are frequently collected into the trade-off structure largely interpreted. Advocates of these types of models are frequently point to experimental proof to support their preferred theory. Often suggestion has been made to the survey by Harris and Raviv (1991) or to the experimental study by Titman and Wessels (1988). Both these two standard papers point up a serious empirical difficulty. They are disagreed over basic facts. According to Harris and Raviv (1991, p. 334), the accessible studies normally agree that leverage increases with tangible fixed assets, growth opportunities, non debt tax shields, firm size and decreases with advertising expenditures, volatility, research and development expenditures, profitability, bankruptcy probability, and uniqueness of the product. On the other hand, Titman and Wessels(1988, p. 17) find that their outcome do not provide sustain for an effect on debt ratios due to non debt tax shields, collateral value, volatility, or future growth. Therefore, advocates of exacting theories are presented a choice of absolutely opposing well-known summaries of what we all know from the preceding literature. Obviously this is unacceptable, and th e study aims to assist resolve this experimental difficulty.